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Abstract Almost all the knowledge now produced about psychiatry includes what
is called ‘‘the patient’s or client’s perspective.’’ This paper analyzes how this notion
has been framed in the discourses on mental health over the last two decades,
particularly in mental health research and in anthropology. The very concept of the
‘‘patient’s perspective’’ is a social and historical construct. Despite its remarkable
prevalence, the notion remains vague. Mental health research pictures it as a stable
attribute of the individual. Anthropologists integrate the contextual nature of the
patient view; but they still largely envision the psychiatric patient as a rational actor
producing narratives based on common sense. However, in psychiatric practice, the
client’s perspective is not something the patient individually produces; it is rather
shaped by and in a context. To explore this process, my research investigated
interactions between staff and patients in a French community mental health center,
and showed that the client’s perspective is the result of a collective process. Further
analysis demonstrates that eliciting or producing the patient’s view is sometimes
considered a therapeutic goal in itself, since being granted the status of a rational
and narrative actor gives access to the most valued model of care, one that is based
on partnership. Being an outcome that is negotiated between patients and care
providers, the ‘‘patient’s view’’ then becomes a new resource in mental health
settings.
Statement on ethics: The research conducted for this paper followed the ethical guidelines of the
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withdraw from the study as well as of the rules of confidentiality, the staff members and the residents
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Introduction
What is the patient’s perspective? What is the patient’s subjective experience?
These and similar questions are now common and even unavoidable within the field
of psychiatry in Western countries. The patient’s point of view is everywhere:
anthropologists study ‘‘illness narratives’’ (Izquierdo and Johnson 2007; Kleinman
1988; Mattingly and Garro 2000); governments emphasize the protection of
patients’ rights (JORF 2002; USDHHS 1999); clinicians want to know the patients’
opinion and illness experience (Lillrank 2002; Waserman and Criollo 2000); social
scientists and journalists wonder about the patient’s subjective experience
(Angermeyer and Klusmann 1998; Becker 1998; Busfield 2000; Schneider and
Conrad 1983); and sociologists and clinical researchers include the patient’s view in
their assessment of medical practices (Aranda and Street 2001; Cook and Wright
1995). Almost all the knowledge now produced about psychiatry, as well as in other
fields of medicine, includes what is called ‘‘the patient’s (or client’s) perspective.’’1
A variety of reasons is given by authors to justify the inclusion of the patient’s
view. They are quite heterogeneous. Some underline the quest for more refined
information, or the need to provide a balanced assessment by taking into account the
opinion of all actors (Cook and Wright 1995). Other arguments are moral rather than
pragmatic: they suggest that there is an intrinsic importance in being attentive to what
a patient thinks because it ensures that he or she is treated humanely, as a person
(Barham and Hayward 1991), or they argue that for patients who come from socially
and economically marginalized groups, consideration of the patient’s perspective is
particularly important, as it grants them access to the sphere of legitimate discourse
(Kuipers 1989; Williams and Healy 2001). In both mental health and anthropological
literature, then, there seems to exist a strong expectation, sometimes an obligation,
that mental health services take into account the patient’s perspective. Thus,
advocating for the patient’s perspective takes place within a larger discourse on the
appropriate way to conceive of mental illness and of mental health care.
I would like to challenge the universality of the patient’s view and its appearance
as being self-evident. In doing so, I intend to question how the patient’s view is
socially produced and how its use is defined in practice, paraphrasing what
Desjarlais (1994: 887) suggests about the notion of experience. I believe clinical and
anthropological literature to share two assumptions regarding the patient’s view,
namely, that it is inherently present and that to elucidate it is empowering, and that
both should be challenged. An historical and cultural construct, the patient’s view
also emerges attached to its context: a context that I would suggest is not external
1 On the sensitive topic of the patient/care provider relationship, the very terms employed are infused
with meaning. Various terms have been proposed and used in the last decades to name the individuals
who receive care from psychiatric services, each of them referring to a political stance toward psychiatric
treatment (McLean 1995). In the French context, however, there has been remarkably little debate on this
issue, and care recipients are still widely called ‘‘patients,’’ or sometimes ex-patients.
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but consubstantial. At first glance it would seem that to express his or her opinion, a
patient only needs to be given a space. Yet, in psychiatric practice, as in other fields
of medicine, ‘‘space’’ is not the only thing that is required. Ethnographic data show
that the patient’s view is necessarily shaped by specific social interactions.
How has the interest in the patient’s perspective become so pervasive and how is
it used in the literature? In order to answer this first question, I examine the way the
patient’s (or client’s) perspective has been framed in discourses on mental health
over the last two decades, focusing on mental health research and anthropology.
Then I turn to psychiatric practice in France to understand how patients’ views are
constructed and challenged in the therapeutic process.
The Pervasiveness of the Patient’s View in Theory: A Literature Review
‘‘The Patient’s View Is Stable and Empowering,’’ or Is It So Clear? A Literature
Review
Although the idea that there is such a thing as the patient’s perspective and that it
should be taken into consideration may seem obvious today, analysis of the mental
health and anthropological literature shows that it is clearly an historical product.
Furthermore, it also appears to be a social and cultural construction (Hacking 1999;
Weinberg 2005), with varying degrees of pervasiveness.
The perception of the patient’s words has greatly evolved in the course of the
20th century (Armstrong 1984), an evolution related to a shift in the medical gaze.
Michel Foucault (1963) described the emergence of a medical gaze at the end of the
18th century that reads the patient’s body in order to identify signs leading to the
disease. Around the 1950s, medical perception extended to include the patient not as
an object of inquiry but as a source for eliciting subjective experience (Arney and
Bergen 1983; Baszanger 1991). Also around this time, references to the need for
assessment and outcome measures to take into account what is called the patient’s
view can be found (LeMoigne 2005). However, the process of actually incorpo-
rating it has been slow, and 25 years ago it was still relatively uncommon to ask
patients for an evaluation of their care (Armstrong 1984).
How is the patient’s view integrated in today’s psychiatric research literature?
Outcome measures incorporate the hypothesized effects of patients’ view on their
behavior: patients’ dissatisfaction with their treatment may affect their compliance.
These studies use a wide range of notions to characterize the patient’s view:
attitudes, perceptions, preferences, wishes, goals, needs, expectations and, more
recently, satisfaction and quality of life (e.g., Noble et al. 2001). These various
aspects of the patient’s view are then interpreted using behavior models about health
and illness. The complexity of these models and the particular variables they include
depend on the authors’ therapeutic orientation. As a consequence of this process of
measurement and recording, the set of opinions that make up the patient’s view
becomes a new objectified variable. The patient’s view, according to these studies,
becomes a set of answers to standardized questions that are transformed into
discreet variables. As appears in Rhodes’ (1984) critique, the authors of these
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studies ‘‘consider beliefs to be like ‘things’ which people ‘have’ as they have other
traits’’ (68). In other words, the patient’s view is considered to be a stable attribute
of individuals, born within the individual. Sociologists also point out that this
conception allows researchers to combine an experimental design that largely
reasons in terms of cause and effect with the imperative of taking into account the
‘‘patient’s subjectivity’’ (Busfield 2000).
An examination of the evolution of quality-of-life measures illustrates the trend
toward objectifying subjective dimensions of illness (Benamouzig and Velpry
2001). When these measures were introduced in the 1960s for policy planning and
cost reduction purposes, data collected by care providers or the investigator
included only objective quality-of-life criteria. These ranged from global mortality
or survival rates to indicators of the ability to function in daily life; they did not
depend on the patient’s appreciation of his or her quality of life. Today, almost all
measures include subjective dimensions of quality-of-life criteria, and the data are
collected, at least in part, directly from the patients (Corten 1998). Interestingly, this
shift has been incorporated in psychiatry with a delay (Atkinson and Zibin 1996).
This may be due to the fact that, in psychiatry, what a patient says may be
considered a symptom of mental illness instead of an opinion to be incorporated into
health care planning. Even today, many assessment tools in psychiatry combine
evaluations of the outcome by the staff as well as by the patient.
The incorporation of the patient’s and then the client’s perspective, which has
been established over the last 30 years, has not been limited to mental health
researchers’ assessment tools.2 The self, the individual and the subjective
experience are of interest in many areas of knowledge-production about psychiatry.
In the last 25 years, medical anthropology has thoroughly explored this area
(Velpry 2003). Researchers who emphasize the cultural, in addition to the
biological, dimension of mental illness describe the cultural specificity of mental
illnesses in the Western world through the study of illness experience (Good 1977;
Kleinman 1980, 1988; Littlewood 1990; Velpry 2006). However, the way these two
dimensions connect and participate in shaping mental illness has been debated
(Velpry 2006; Young 1981; Zempleni 1988). Making It Crazy, a pioneering
ethnography on outpatient psychiatric treatment by Sue Estroff (1981), is one of the
first studies to explicitly emphasize the patient’s view. In the following years, a field
developed around issues of experience, the self, narrative and identity. Authors have
increasingly described their interest in the client’s perspective with reference to the
subjective experience and the self (Corin 1990; Estroff 1989; Good et al. 2001;
Leibing and Cohen 2006; Saris 1995; Strauss and Estroff 1989), sparking
philosophical debates on the nature and access to this ‘‘self’’ and on how the
notion of person is used (Heinimaa 2000; Lovell 1997). The necessity of an
epistemological discussion has drawn some authors to use narrative theory, thus
shifting their interest toward ‘‘illness narratives’’ (Estroff et al. 1991; Hyde´n 1997;
Mattingly and Garro 2000). Narrative theory and references to identity have become
2 This trend is noticeable in medicine in general, as well as in other social realms. In this respect,
integrating the consumer’s perspective has become a social imperative that extends well beyond
psychiatry.
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central interests in the field of medical anthropology, with some authors considering
the role of narrative in identity construction (Somers 1994).
In anthropology, the patient’s perspective has been described as context-
dependent. Contrary to the assumptions made for mental-health research protocols,
social scientists do not assume that a person’s point of view is a stable, individually
produced attribute. As anthropologists have shown, it is necessarily produced by,
as well as expressed in, a context (Biehl 2005; Lovell 1997). Furthermore,
anthropological approaches identify subjective experience as part of a political
stance, thus framing the client’s perspective in terms of power and politics
(Littlewood 1990; McLean 1995). According to this frame, attention to subjective
experience of mental illness is alleged to help psychiatric clients’ collaboration with
the staff and involvement in their treatment process; to incorporate a concern for the
client’s experience is thus considered a path to rehabilitation and empowerment.
This way, subjective experience acquires a political meaning. The work of some
anthropologists is directed toward improving mental health treatment by better
informing physicians and policy makers (Rosenfield 1992, 1999), while others
assume that the patient, once empowered, will act as a force for change (McLean
1995). When investigating the work of such anthropologists more closely, conflicts
between the political meaning of the patient’s view and its conceptual framing
appear. For the reader of their works, it seems that both the informing and the
empowering character of the patient’s view tends to obliterate its contextual nature.
Quite often, then, when the patient’s view is referred to, it is considered a stable
attribute of the individual, something the patient carried all along without having an
opportunity to express it. For some researchers the patient’s view has also become
an imperative; in her critique, Butt (2002) underlines how the ‘‘suffering stranger’’
has become a recurrent figure in anthropology. She argues that this figure is used for
the purpose of a wider theoretical agenda, one of defense of social justice.
According to her, such a rhetorical use of these ‘‘individual voices and stories’’
reduces the richness of human life to a moral model, thus denying them ‘‘a place to
act’’ (17).
Although by introducing the effect of context, the anthropological framework
begins to more profoundly characterize the patient’s view, the notion remains
vague. Desjarlais (1994) has noted that ‘‘experience, it seems, is a crucial element of
contemporary academic thought; to try to write about humans without reference to
experience is like trying to think the unthinkable’’ (886). Even if many authors seem
to put subjective experience at the core of their research, they usually seem to
consider it a neutral and common-sense notion, one that does not need to be defined
theoretically or empirically. As Desjarlais claims,
In listening to the debates sparked by these different orientations [of analyses
of experience], one gets the sense that everyone knows what is meant by
experience. Yet it is rarely defined and, when it is defined, it involves a generic
‘we’…. Yet despite its apparent necessity, as something that can and must be
thought, its universality remains in question. We must ask if experience is as
essential or as commonplace as it [is taken] to be. (887)
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I think this investigation of the notion of experience could start with the notion of
the patient’s view, which is usually either equated with the patient’s experience or
considered as a point of access to at least part of what the patient experiences.
In the literature, mental health research and medical anthropology each promote
a version of the patient’s perspective. Their understanding of the notion differs; in
the first case it is an individual attribute, while in the second it is context-dependent.
However, in both cases, this understanding is assumed to rest on common sense.
Analyzing interactions during focus groups, Lehoux et al. (2006) argue that ‘‘the
patient’s view is the result of context-dependent social interactions that need to be
scrutinized.’’ To really understand what the patient’s view is, I suggest we
investigate the role of the context in its shaping.
Ethnographic data I gathered in psychiatric settings show that patients do not
spontaneously create a ‘‘view.’’ Rather, the patient’s view is something that has to be
produced jointly with the participation of the staff. In these interactions, at least two
main processes are required for a patient to express an opinion. First, patients have to
‘‘know’’ what their opinion is and how to express it. For example, when the first
program assessment forms designed to be completed by the patient were introduced,
the staff had to ‘‘teach’’ patients how to express their opinion (R. Bebout, personal
communication, September 2002). Second, professionals have to recognize what the
patient says as an opinion rather than a symptom of mental illness.
I would argue that in the study of this process of construction, psychiatry is not one
example among others but, rather, constitutes a privileged setting from which to
exercise the scrutiny Lehoux et al. call for. Because mental illness is deemed to impair
the very capacity to have and express a view, in a psychiatric setting, what the patient
says either may contribute to the shaping of ‘‘a view’’ or may be treated as a symptom
and included as part of a clinical assessment. Each side of the alternative entails a
different power relationship between patient and care providers. The coexistence in
psychiatric practice of two paradoxical conceptions of the patient—the first in which
the patient is seen to be capable of having a view, and the second where the patient is
considered incapable of fully understanding and expressing his or her own inner
world—makes the process of shaping the patient’s view more visible.
Under these conditions, the patient’s view becomes less self-evident and new
questions appear: How does one come to have a point of view? What is a point of
view? Who determines what constitutes a point of view? Of what use is it to have a
point of view? Does everyone have a point of view? To explore these issues, I now
turn to an analysis of psychiatric practice based on my ethnographic fieldwork.
The Elusiveness of the Patient’s View in Practice: Ethnography of Psychiatry
in French Public Psychiatric Services
Carla3 is a woman in her 50s who is considered to have a severe psychotic disorder.4
She has been independently managing her daily life for many years, with the help of
3 All names used in this paper are pseudonyms.
4 This is how Carla’s care providers refer to her disorder. I don’t refer here to a DSM IV diagnosis, since
the staff very seldom used it.
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a guardian, while being treated as an outpatient at a community mental health
center. She is currently living in supported housing, which means that she rents an
apartment from the mental health center, which provides her with material and
moral support. She recently inherited money and, as a result, has the financial
capacity to buy an apartment. As moving out of supported housing is one of the
expected goals of the residents, the topic is often introduced in support-group
discussions by Carla’s care providers. Every time this occurs, Carla invariably says
that she wants to buy her own place. Yet, care providers are convinced that she does
not ‘‘really’’ want to live on her own and that she is actually too scared to try.
What is Carla’s view in this case? If, in a literal sense, Carla’s point of view is
what she expressed to the group, then it would be that she wants to buy and move
into her own place. In any other context this would automatically be called ‘‘her
opinion’’ or ‘‘her view.’’ In a psychiatric context, there is another interpretation of
what Carla wants, and it emerges from the staff’s own interpretations. What is
remarkable about the staff’s opinions is that they assume their interpretation to be
not an alternative view of what Carla should do, but her ‘‘real,’’ unexpressed, point
of view. In other words, they know what her ‘‘true’’ opinion is, despite what she
says. This substitution is made possible by the differential legitimacy of the
patient’s versus the care provider’s word in the psychiatric context. What is Carla’s
perspective: Is it the one she expresses or the one that the staff legitimizes?
In psychiatric practice, then, more than in other fields of medicine, the patient’s
view, because of his or her pathologies’ symptoms, is not a straightforward notion
but one that is embedded in a relational context and that raises the issue of the
capacity for rationality. In the next section, I examine the extent to which there is a
patient’s view, and how it is developed through interaction, using a supported
housing program for people with mental illness as an example. The housing
program is linked to a community center whose model of care advocates autonomy
and personal change. In this model, the development of the patient’s view is an
expected outcome of the treatment and, at the same time, one of several frameworks
structuring patient staff relationships. It becomes apparent that in this context, the
patient’s perspective is a co-construction that takes place as patient and professional
negotiate a therapeutic model. As I will explain, this treatment model is an
important part of the context of psychiatric practice. This leads to a new question,
which is addressed in the final part of this paper: Is the patient’s view specific to a
certain conception of mental illness and its treatment?
Background and Method
Over the course of the year 2003, I conducted ethnographic fieldwork in a French
public supported housing program for mental health patients. The French deinsti-
tutionalization movement was initiated some 50 years ago. As a part of this process,
the country was divided into 70,000 territorial units called secteurs (catchment
areas). Each secteur offers a range of public mental health services including a
community mental health center, hospital beds and programs such as day centers,
crisis centers and supported housing. When the reform was created, emphasis was put
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on accessibility and continuity of care and a unique, multidisciplinary team assigned
to each secteur. Implementation of the reform has been a long and, in large part,
voluntary process, resulting in heterogeneous modes of implementation at the level
of the secteur throughout the nation. However, a few common features of psychiatric
practice in the French public services can be identified: although each patient is
treated by a multidisciplinary team, the patient is usually referred for care by a
psychiatrist and very rarely by social workers. This, and the fact that psychoanalysis
and institutional psychotherapy5 have been and still are very influential, may be one
of the reasons why programs that would call for the strongest involvement of social
work, such as psychosocial rehabilitation,6 are relatively underdeveloped in these
services. Psychiatric patient movements remain similarly underdeveloped in
comparison with the North American system;7 they are quite recent and still not
wholly integrated into the French mental health system. Therefore, whereas in North
America various terms have been proposed and used in the last decades to name the
individuals who receive care from psychiatric services, each of them referring to a
political stance toward psychiatric treatment (McLean 1995), in the French context
there has been remarkably little debate on this issue, and care recipients are still
widely called ‘‘patients’’—especially in psychiatric settings.
Although the fieldwork for this research consisted of attending various
therapeutic group meetings of patients and staff, as well as staff meetings and
repeated interviews with patients, I here rely only on data gathered at supported
housing program patient group and staff meetings. Patients in this program live in
individual or shared apartments. All of them have to attend a weekly group meeting,
which is led by two staff members and where daily life issues are discussed. My
observations show that the discussion of these issues involves learning to express
feelings and opinions and constitutes an occasion to work collectively on the
construction of patients’ views. The interpretation of what patients say in the group,
and how their views are subsequently negotiated, has consequences for what the
clinicians think the patient can or cannot do, obtain, or expect.
Is There More Than One Patient’s View? The Patient’s Perspective in a Model
of Care
Carla’s example makes it apparent that if a statement is not recognized as valid by the
professionals, it will be attributed not to the patient’s insight but, rather, to the illness.
5 Institutional psychotherapy appeared in French psychiatric hospitals after the Second World War, and
aimed at transforming the hospital itself into a therapeutic tool. The term has been used for very diverse
experiences, which share a strong reference to psychoanalysis, especially Jacques Lacan, and to group
therapy.
6 Psychosocial (or psychiatric) rehabilitation refers to a great variety of treatment programs; all
emphasize recovery and aim at restoring an optimal level of independent functioning in the community.
Although the reference to psychosocial rehabilitation has greatly expanded in North American mental
health services as well as in Europe in the last decades, its influence is still limited in the French public
psychiatric sector.
7 This statement is by no means a judgment. It is based on complementary research I carried out in
Washington, DC.
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In the psychiatric context, the staff sometimes believe that they are better able than
the patient to know and express the patient’s perspective. This points to a critical
aspect of psychiatry: what a patient says in a psychiatric setting may be called either
the patient’s view or a symptom of mental illness. It opens two questions: First, how
does this process of qualification occur? Second, what is at stake in this process?
When Oscar, a resident, describes a mouse that often visits him, is it an actual
mouse? When Charles, another resident, complains of the smell of Chinese food
coming into his apartment in the mornings, is it real or delusional and thereby
attributed to the resident’s racial/ethic prejudices? These questions were raised by the
staff during their bimonthly meeting and fostered discussion. Both Oscar and Charles
were considered ‘‘covertly delusional,’’ to a degree varying over time. By ‘‘covertly
delusional,’’ the staff refer to patients who appear ‘‘normal’’ and well functioning in
superficial conversations, but who are revealed to have delusional thinking in more
profound exchanges. The nurse who had heard Oscar describe the mouse perceived
him as being quite convincing. The psychologist noted that the building was known
for being poorly maintained. Another nurse gave contrasting examples of delusional
statements repeatedly made by this resident. About the smell of Chinese food
complained of by Charles, various staff members remembered a few occasions when
they had noted the resident’s racial prejudices. The psychologist also pointed to the
fact that this kind of food odor was unlikely to appear in the mornings. Considering
all these elements of each statement’s context, the mouse was considered to be real
and the smell to be delusional. As a consequence, the staff acted to get Oscar to use
a mousetrap, while the staff’s image of Charles as ‘‘covertly delusional’’ was
reinforced. Yet, in the literal sense, both these statements can be defined as ‘‘patients’
views.’’ What is remarkable about these two examples is that there is no way to
determine the veracity of the statements without additional information, yet a
judgment has to be made nonetheless.
When a statement made by a patient is not interpreted as a view or opinion, there
are two alternative interpretations: professionals may consider the statement to be
delusion, as in Charles’ case, or simply an impractical goal, as it appears to be in
Carla’s example. Common discourse used in medical settings usually attributes a
lay view, as opposed to a medical view, to the patient. Depending on the
particularities of patients’ mental states, their lay views may also be categorized as
‘‘crazy,’’ which effectively disqualifies and discredits these views. At least at some
moments, a mental patient may be considered not to have (or to have lost) the very
capacity to express something that would be accepted as a point of view.
Before examining how these interpretations take place within a model of care, I
describe with more precision how I define the different categories of statements
patients make, and the corresponding types of patients as they are categorized by
psychiatric practice. As I have shown in the first part of this paper, mental health
research and medical anthropology delineate two conceptions of the patient’s
perspective, which refer to a specific understanding of the patient. In their study
designs and discussions, mental health researchers conceive of the client as a largely
rational actor, able to engage in the management of his or her illness in partnership
with the staff, and to express natural opinions that staff are able to easily access.
Medical anthropologists imagine a narrative actor, willing and able to constitute his
Cult Med Psychiatry
123
or her identity through narrative. Together, these two conceptions shape the patient
as a rational and narrative actor. This understanding of the patient can be found in
the categories used by the staff in psychiatric practice. As I will show, this idea of
the patient can be found in the supported housing program’s model of treatment: the
patient as rational and narrative actor is an explicitly expected therapeutic outcome.
Yet such a conception only partially meets how psychiatric clinicians view the
patient. It is not adapted to incorporate any statement that is considered ‘‘psychotic,’’
delusional or impractical. Since it appears that in psychiatric practice not all patients
have a view at all times, the idea of the patient as a rational and narrative actor stands
as an ideal. The irrational patient is not excluded from the model of care, but becomes
part of it. This patient should be assisted in reaching the ideal of the rational and
narrative actor to the extent that the staff believe he or she is capable.
Each of these understandings of the patient, rational or irrational, influences the
way in which patients and professionals interact in the clinical setting: a patient
stating an opinion, like the fact that there is a mouse in his apartment, is considered to
be a rational and narrative actor, and interactions with professionals will take place in
a partnership model where patients and professionals collaborate in managing the
illness. Conversely, a patient describing a delusion, like Chinese food smell coming
into his apartment, will be treated as a ‘‘psychotic’’ actor. ‘‘Psychotic’’ is a term used
among staff members to describe a patient whose life patterns are strongly deviant
(like staying in bed all day, never cooking, not having personal relationships, etc.) as
a consequence of mental illness. In these cases, for clinicians, psychiatric treatment is
based on putting aside what the patient says and deciding on the appropriate action.
At such moments the patient’s perspective cannot exist in psychiatric practice. When
evoked by staff members, the two modes of interaction between staff and patients I
describe here do not pertain to a theoretical discourse on psychiatric treatment.
Rather they constitute ‘‘situated concepts’’ (Floersch 2002), in the sense that their
definition incorporates a situated knowledge developed by the staff that stems from
practice. Interestingly, the two situated concepts Floersch defines in his study of a
case management program in Kansas are very similar to the ones I just described. On
the one hand, case managers ‘‘do with’’ consumers when they consider them to be
‘‘high-functioning.’’ On the other, they ‘‘do for’’ consumers who appear to be ‘‘low-
functioning.’’ This correspondence between my findings and Floersch’s is even more
striking given how much the two settings diverge organizationally as well as in their
theoretical references (Velpry 2006). It leads to the hypothesis of a certain stability of
some ‘‘modes of doing good’’ (Pols 2003) for care providers in psychiatry. Returning
to Carla’s housing plans, the consequence of the disqualification by the staff of her
statement that she wants to live on her own clearly materializes in the staff’s attitude.
By concluding that what she says is not really what she wants, the staff avoid
assisting her in her plans toward independent living, and decline to offer material or
moral support for her efforts. Furthermore, they do not consider this goal to be part of
the therapeutic project. Therefore, how a patient’s words are qualified determines
how the patient will be taken care of.8
8 The nature of the interaction between patient and staff is unstable, meaning that interpretation is an
ongoing process (Velpry 2008).
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These two understandings of the patients are also appreciated and valued
differently by the staff and by society at large. Psychiatric practice requires constant
balancing between the two poles of collaboration and of assistance. What I argue
below is that the two poles are united through making the narrative and rational
actor the main therapeutic goal. In psychiatric practice, one of the justifications for
action is to enable patients to participate in a collaborative model of care. The
support group is a good place to observe this process since it gathers care providers
and patients around the discursive material of expressed views.
The Patient’s Perspective as a Collective Project
In the support group I observed, all the participants appeared to be working
collectively to construct the patients’ status in the interaction. This construction
occurs through the way care providers ‘‘hear’’ what patients ‘‘say.’’ Formally, the
patient is given a status of partner, that is, of an agent, in the group. However, since
a goal of the group is also for the care provider to exert a therapeutic intervention
(e.g., to get the patient to change his or her behavior or outlook), the patient is an
object of the interaction at the same time that he or she is an agent of it. This double
position leads to conflicts, which arise most clearly around the interpretation of the
patient’s words, or the construction of specific viewpoints.
How do group participants work collectively at constructing views? The support
group is a place where each resident9 learns to express feelings and opinions. In the
supported housing group, residents come to discuss their living situations, their
daily activities and recent events in their lives. Specific topics are diverse: from
plumbing problems to the news to description of future projects. The intervention on
the part of the staff members (psychiatrist, psychologist, or nurse) can consist of
encouraging the residents to express or formulate an opinion through recurrent
questions. Sometimes this is done by ‘‘correcting’’ or consolidating existing
opinions expressed by the residents. When a resident expresses something in the
group, be it a perception, an opinion or an attitude, it will be responded to by all
members (staff and residents). This generally leads to an interpretation and
qualification by staff members of what is said and done.
The criteria used to qualify a statement have a normative dimension; the values
of the group members, both resident and staff, are used to judge residents’
expectations of what daily life should be. Residents in the group are expected to
adopt these values. However, the way in which this normative dimension is
incorporated by the participants is complex. Both the staff and the patients are
conscious of an ideal of social and personal well-being, which consists of the
individual’s ability to take care of him- or herself, willingness to live a productive or
at least an active life and recognition of the existence of an illness and the necessity
of treatment. The actual expectations of the staff combine these features with what
they assume to be each patient’s personal limits, which are usually understood to
result from the patient’s illness. Normative expectations will be modified depending
9 Here and throughout the paper, ‘‘resident’’ refers to patients living in supported housing.
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on assessments of the patient’s capacity. Before examining the role these
expectations play in the interpretation of the patient’s statements, I look at the
way they appear in the group’s discourse.
Speech is quite free in the group. Residents can and do express opinions that they
know oppose staff ideas. During one session, for example, Oscar advocates smoking
marijuana as a legitimate form of self-medication: ‘‘Weed will cure me. I need to
stay in bed and concentrate to get better.’’ Commenting on his statement, the two
staff members bring up arguments against his practices, but without going further
into the critique and with no apparent intention to convince Oscar. In general,
residents maintain their opinions even when they contradict the common-sense
values held by staff members. Discussing tobacco consumption, a psychologist asks
the smokers among the residents if buying cigarettes would remain a priority were
the price to rise so high as to endanger their budget balance. They all say they would
keep buying cigarettes without a second thought, even if it is clear to everyone that
this is not the ‘‘expected’’ answer. Indeed, the staff members do not comment on this
deviation from the expected answer. In the whole discussion, then, the staff
members have not explicitly stated what the normative behavior is. Rather, through
their questions, they have given the residents an opportunity to express conformity
to, or acceptance of, these norms, an opportunity that has not been taken. It should
be noted that the fact that the residents do not respond adequately to the staff’s
expectations does not mean that they are unaware of them. Discussions in the group
thus convey normative statements, yet the staff members never make it explicit that
they expect the residents to conform to or accept them. Rather, they seem to be
waiting for the day when the residents will spontaneously converge with their
normative views.
Most often, the work on behavior, especially on lifestyle, occurs through this
pattern of implicit expectations. The expectations appear through certain repetitive,
even ritualized questions and through emphasis on the desirability of conformist
behavior. ‘‘To do something with your day’’ is an example of expected behavior.
During group sessions, the question ‘‘What did you do this weekend?’’ is a ritualized
one. The way residents answer is ritualized as well, as appears in my fieldnotes:
Be´re´nice (a psychologist) asks if someone went out last weekend. Walter says
he went out with friends, to see a soccer game. Maurice says that he didn’t go
out and adds that he has a lot of things to do at home, like reading or listening
to music. Serge says that he didn’t go out, Charles says so too, as well as
Carla, who smiles as she says so. Be´re´nice tells her she should go out when it’s
so nice outside. Carla answers that she looked at the sun, but didn’t feel like
going out. Me´lanie says that she went out each day. Be´re´nice insists for a few
minutes that one should go out when it’s sunny, rather than staying at home.
She is not addressing anyone in particular.
This particular exchange takes place every session; every time it follows
approximately the same lines and includes the same protagonists. In this sense, it is
ritualized. The scheme adopted here shows how a normative expectation (here, ‘‘to
go out on the weekends’’) is stated as a general opinion. The recurrence over time of
the question (‘‘What did you do this weekend?’’) indicates the psychologist’s
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expectation of the residents having done something, since it would be a positive sign
of a clinical evolution. Yet, even if the residents are aware of this expectation (as
shown, for example, by Carla’s smile), they most often give the ‘‘wrong’’ answer
that they did not go out.
By answering ‘‘no,’’ the residents participate in a ritualized exchange with the
staff without completely playing the game. Changing habits is another object of
attention for staff concerned with daily life. Every year, Paul goes on vacation for
4 days, at the same place and on the same dates. During a session, a staff member
asks him if he wouldn’t for once like to leave for longer. Paul says, ‘‘No, I wouldn’t
like to.’’ When Be´re´nice asks him why, he gives different answers successively. He
says first that it is too expensive, then that he has medicine to take, then that he
doesn’t want to be away for too long, and, finally, that he just doesn’t feel like it.
Paul’s answer seems to show his understanding that he should justify his actions to
the staff. In contrast, Carla, when asked this kind of question, just smiles and says
no, she doesn’t feel like it. By doing this she appears to refuse the kind of discussion
proposed by the staff, feeling that she has the right to keep her private life and
reasons for her decisions to herself. While Paul and Carla react differently to this
intrusion on their lifestyles, both are aware of the normative implication of the
question, and of the fact that they deviate from this norm.
The existence of this game probably explains the ritualized role of the exchanges
in the group. It has become sp ritualized, in fact, that similar topics are sometimes
introduced by residents as well as by staff. Some do it often and spontaneously,
narrating their week or describing recent news. It is certainly the case that the degree
to which residents reveal private aspects of their lives depends on what they want to
share. Yet, regardless of what exactly is revealed, for everyone, the feeling of
intimacy and inclusion in the group depends on the definition of a patient role
through ritualized and stereotyped comments.
The description of how normative expectations are formulated in the group shows
that the interpretation of a statement as a point of view takes place within a larger
effort to affect patients’ behavior. The goal of interventions made by the staff is not
only to assess the patient’s capacity to present him- or herself as a rational and
narrative actor, and thus capable of having a point of view, but also to help the patient
become such an actor, within his or her assumed limits. Therefore, going back to the
central question, the patient’s view appears to be an expected result of the group
rather than an attribute of the patient. The shaping of the patient’s viewpoint is
negotiated through the way the patients talk and the staff listens. I now turn to an
exploration of this specific relationship that shapes the patient’s view, and of how the
collective production of the patient’s view relates to the notion of autonomy.
Negotiating a Perspective: A Narrow Path to Autonomy
It is true that in the supported housing program we try to develop
autonomy, but it is a structured autonomy, not a variable one.
Staff member
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To explain the way a relationship geared toward producing a rational and
narrative patient is negotiated between patient and staff, I need to enlarge the scope
of analysis. Within the support group, the therapeutic intervention focuses on
behaviors that take place outside the group. The preceding analysis of the discussion
group has revealed the conditions for the construction of a patient’s view and the
normative dimension of the group. However, the support group is part of a set of
interventions that constitutes the supported housing program. Other interventions
include home visits and help with daily activities as necessary. An important
difference between these activities and the support group is that they act directly on
behavior through coaching. This combination of tools, namely, coaching and
talking, comprises the therapeutic model of the program that I now describe in more
detail.
The supported housing program I studied can be conceived of as a space where
residents and staff work together. While they share common goals (to control
residents’ illness and to manage their daily life, financial resources and social
relationships), the means they use may diverge widely (Velpry 2006). For the staff,
these means consist of a process of profound personal transformation for residents,
which they have to accept as well as appropriate. Therefore, the supported housing
program, as a therapeutic process, is centered on engaging and supporting residents
through change. This change focuses not only on behavior but on development of
notions such as autonomy and responsibility through verbal exchange. Residents are
expected to take responsibility for their lives, or at least for their expectations. The
delicate part of the therapeutic intervention, therefore, is that the care provider must
both alter the resident’s behavior and allow their relationship to evolve from that of
assistance to collaboration. In order to meet these two goals, the balance between
‘‘doing for’’ and ‘‘doing with,’’ to use Floersch’s words, is constantly reassessed.
A successful intervention will replace a regime where interventions are imposed
on the resident with one of collaboration between care providers and residents. With
this evolution, the status of the resident in the relationship is transformed, as is the
extent to which the care providers will intrude in the resident’s private life. If we
take the example of housecleaning, in a ‘‘regime of imposition’’ (doing for), care
providers may themselves clean the residents’ apartments, while in a ‘‘regime of
collaboration’’ (doing with), they will not. At most they may advise the resident that
he or she should clean up the house; whether the resident actually does is his or her
responsibility. The position of the resident is different in the two regimes. In the
transformation of the resident’s status, how his or her statements are interpreted is
crucial. This is especially true in supported housing, where a large part of the
interpretation of a resident’s behavior in daily activities occurs through the
resident’s description during the group of what he or she does rather than by direct
observation. It is important how what the patient says organizes and structures the
therapeutic framework: the patient’s words are clinical material that providers use
during treatment. It is apparent that by changing the regime from imposition to
collaboration, and thus modifying the patient’s position in his or her relationships
with care providers, the status of discourse and the definition and limits of therapy
are altered.
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During staff meetings, care providers determine residents’ capacity for autonomy
and responsibility, which allows them to select the appropriate regime of
intervention; this has important consequences for therapeutic decisions. In the
following cases, we see how interactions are adjusted when new residents resist the
existing therapeutic framework proposed by the staff. Although part of this
framework consists of instilling autonomy, the staff members remain the ones to
judge whether a behavior qualifies as a sign of autonomy. Hence, in some instances,
patients showing their autonomy in daily life management, in particular, at the
domestic level, constitute a form of resistance. This is especially the case when the
autonomy asserted is not the outcome of the therapeutic process and therefore has
never been directly controlled by the staff members.
Norbert pictures himself as an independent person, one who has always
succeeded in meeting his basic needs whatever the circumstances. He was admitted
into the supported housing program after hospitalization left him without a housing
solution. For Norbert, the constraints of the admission process were hard to get
through because they conflicted with his conception of personal independence, an
independence he particularly wanted to prove to care providers. Meanwhile, for the
staff, Norbert’s acceptance of the admission process was considered part of the
therapeutic process. When Norbert viewed accessing this apartment as ‘‘a leg up,’’
he was referring to socioeconomic hardship rather than a hardship resulting from his
mental illness. Following this logic, he was happy to be visited by psychiatric nurses
but handled them like social visits. Therefore, instead of letting them in for a
discussion of his personal and housing issues, he used to cook lunch and invite them
to eat with him as guests. This inability to take staff’s expectations into account
made it difficult for the staff to frame their interaction in a way they found
acceptable. In other words, by maintaining his behavior, which was perceived as a
complete lack of recognition of the therapeutic context defended by the staff,
Norbert was asking them to treat him as a very special patient. Because care
providers had known Norbert for several years, they accepted a larger margin of
deviance from him than from other residents.
At this point, the evolution of the situation was undetermined. For it to go
Norbert’s way, Norbert would have to truly assert and prove his capacity for
autonomy, by, for example, demonstrating that he had found the job for which he
routinely said he was actively searching. Since various aspects of his behavior
became more and more bizarre, his statements were increasingly interpreted as
delusional in discussions between staff members. In this context, elements of his
situation, such as the fact that he faked taking his medication and paid his rent
irregularly, were newly incorporated into the staff discussions as clinical material,
adding to their eventual assessment of him as being in an active period of his illness.
This interpretation was confirmed when, following a violent crisis at his apartment,
Norbert was readmitted to the hospital. At the next staff meeting, the decision was
made to exclude Norbert from the program. This was a very unusual decision; when
hospitalized, residents were usually kept in the program until plans for their release
could be discussed. In Norbert’s case, however, it was considered by the staff the
logical conclusion to a string of factors that were now all pointing to Norbert’s
incapacity to live independently at that time. What should be noted, however, is that
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had Norbert shown a greater ability to manage life on his own, which the staff had
come to expect from him, all these factors would not have been considered
indicative of illness. This example emphasizes the contextual nature in which staff
members consider residents capable of autonomy.
Christophe’s case contrasts with Norbert’s because, although a similar conflict of
interpretation emerged, the negotiation between resident and staff was a success. In
both cases, the conflict rests on the resident’s initial claim to manage his life
independently. Christophe’s claim focused on the apartment. When interacting with
the staff, he refused the patient/care provider framework and acted in a framework
that emphasized a renter/landlord relationship. This behavior was very offensive to
the staff because he undermined the therapeutic framework of their actions. The
psychologist remarked during a staff meeting: ‘‘Last night, Christophe came to the
center at 6 pm and asked for X [a patient]. We couldn’t believe it.… Then he said he
needed us to change the bulb in the kitchen. I felt like we were a real estate agency. I
can’t find the therapeutic project here.’’
Like Norbert, Christophe violated the rules for resident behavior and almost
explicitly asked for special treatment that would recognize his autonomy in daily
life management. But Christophe didn’t refuse the rules imposed by the staff: he
paid rent and wasn’t violent; rather, he displaced them by trying to establish
cooperation on the basis of housing. This may explain the numerous discussions
among staff members that centered around how to decide whether Christophe’s
behavior was pathological or normal, and if and how they should reassert their
therapeutic role:
Psychiatrist: Christophe is still acting normal, it is just that sometimes he says
things that are off track. Or would it be a ‘‘folie des grandeurs’’?10
Psychologist: I wonder what the therapeutic project is. Or is it only housing?
Nurse: He doesn’t have the notion of therapy.
Psychologist: Is his story about volunteering with older residents true?
In this discussion among staff during a meeting, we see that everything
Christophe says, as well as his daily activities, comes to be questioned. Yet, after a
series of similar incidents, each party adjusted his or her expectations and behavior.
The staff still refused to play the role of the landlord with Christophe, even though
this role may be predominant with other residents who don’t ask for it but are
considered unable to take care of their housing tasks. Yet, they accepted that he
addressed them as landlord and stopped interpreting these attempts as pathological.
Rather, they tried to see them as an effort toward achieving more autonomy.
Christophe, for his part, accepted that he must ‘‘treat them as care providers,’’ as he
formulated it. By this, he meant that he tried not to feel rejected or insulted by their
refusal to act as his landlord and, instead, blamed it on their medical ethos. In
Christophe’s case, his ability to adjust his behavior to the staff’s expectations is
partially what allowed a successful outcome: his allowing the staff members to
occupy the therapeutic role as they felt they had to lessened the staff’s expectations
10 ‘‘Folie des grandeurs’’ refers to grandiose delusions and is used as a synonym for megalomania.
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for Christophe’s behavior and gave him the feeling that he indeed had more
autonomy.
These two examples illustrate a tension intrinsic to psychiatric interventions: on
the one hand, the goal of the therapist is to help patients to live independently,
without therapeutic support. To achieve this, staff place strict rules and limits on
behavior and accept a narrow margin of deviance. Here, the therapeutic goal of the
program is for residents to ‘‘learn’’ to live by themselves in their own place. Yet, to
reach this goal, care providers require that residents increase their autonomy
progressively. If a resident is acting in a way that is considered too autonomous too
quickly, staff may read the behavior through a clinical lens and define it as
pathological. Inversely, if patients are too conformist, they will be deemed passive.
In the supported housing program, then, the negotiation centers on the limits of
autonomy.
Conclusion
The patient’s view has become unavoidable in every discourse about psychiatry.
This emphasis on the patient’s perspective is the product of an historical and
cultural evolution. Today, mental health research treats the patient’s view as a stable
attribute of the person as well as a tool of empowerment. It considers the notion to
be evident and natural. Ethnographic data presented in this paper show that the
patient’s perspective is a more complicated notion than often appears in the
discourse of mental health professionals.
First, the patient’s perspective is not independent of the psychiatric context,
where it is sometimes even considered a therapeutic goal in itself. Observations in a
support group of patients in psychiatric care show that the patient’s view is not a
given but a construct that results from participation in the group. Second, the
perception of the patient as a rational and narrative actor is in conflict with another
version of the patient, less present in the discourse but observable in practice: one
that I have called the ‘‘psychotic’’ actor. From there it appears that to be granted a
legitimate and rational ‘‘point of view,’’ a patient has to walk a fine line between
showing autonomy and conforming to the staff’s ideas on the limits of the patient’s
capacities. If patients are ‘‘too independent,’’ they risk being discredited as
‘‘irresponsible.’’ If they don’t show enough independence, they will appear too
passive and therefore ‘‘too sick to get well.’’ In this sense it is a normative notion,
normative being used in a nonpejorative sense. Finally, the ‘‘patient’s view’’ is
negotiated as a result of the therapeutic process and constitutes a resource to be used
in interactions in medical settings, for both patients and care providers. As a
resource, it permits patients to be attributed status and credit in discussions with
staff members. The more patients’ actions correspond with provider views, the less
their behavior and words risk being interpreted as symptoms of mental illness.
Anthropologists have developed an interest in the patient’s perspective as well.
Attempts to frame it as context-dependent have shifted attention to the narrative
identity of the client and its empowering effects, thus focusing again on the
individual. My goal in this paper was not to show that emphasizing patient
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empowerment and the patient’s view is wrong. Rather, I have emphasized that the
patient’s view is not a stable, individually produced attribute, waiting for a venue
for expression. I have argued that attention to the context should consist in focusing
on the process of production of the patient’s view in mental health settings.
Negotiated between patients and care providers, the ‘‘patient’s view’’ becomes a
new resource: it gives the patient status and credit in the discussion, and greater
freedom of action. Therefore, it seems more accurate to conclude that the inclusion
of the patient’s perspective in psychiatric practice does indeed change the way
negotiation is conducted, regardless of whether it does or does not liberate the
patient.
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